Four Guilty Parties behind Attack

A short interview broadcast by CNN late last week featuring two
participants – a Palestinian in Gaza and an Israeli within range of the rocket
attacks – did not follow the usual script.
For once, a media outlet dropped its role as gatekeeper, there to
mediate and therefore impair our understanding of what is taking place between
Israel and the Palestinians, and inadvertently became a simple window on real
events.
The usual aim of such “balance” interviews relating to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is twofold: to reassure the audience that both
sides of the story are being presented fairly; and to dissipate potential
outrage at the deaths of Palestinian civilians by giving equal time to the
suffering of Israelis.
But the deeper function of such coverage in relation to Gaza, given the
media’s assumption that Israeli bombs are simply a reaction to Hamas terror, is
to redirect the audience’s anger exclusively towards Hamas. In this way, Hamas
is made implicitly responsible for the suffering of both Israelis and
Palestinians.
The dramatic conclusion to CNN’s interview appears, however, to have
otherwise trumped normal journalistic considerations.
The pre-recorded interview via Skype opened with Mohammed Sulaiman in Gaza.
From what looked like a cramped room, presumably serving as a bomb shelter, he
spoke of how he was too afraid to step outside his home. Throughout the
interview, we could hear the muffled sound of bombs exploding in the
near-distance. Mohammed occasionally glanced nervously to his side.
The other interviewee, Nissim Nahoom, an Israeli official in Ashkelon, also
spoke of his family’s terror, arguing that it was no different from that of
Gazans. Except in one respect, he hastened to add: things were worse for
Israelis because they had to live with the knowledge that Hamas rockets were
intended to harm civilians, unlike the precision missiles and bombs Israel
dropped on Gaza.
The interview returned to Mohammed. As he started to speak, the bombing grew
much louder. He pressed on, saying he would not be silenced by what was taking
place outside. The interviewer, Isha Sesay, interrupted – seemingly unsure of
what she was hearing – to inquire about the noise.
Then, with an irony that Mohammed could not have appreciated as he spoke, he
began to say he refused to be drawn into a comparison about whose suffering was
worse when an enormous explosion threw him from his chair and severed the
internet connection. Switching back to the studio, Sesay reassured viewers that
Mohammed had not been hurt.
The bombs, however, spoke more eloquently than either Mohammed or
Nissim.
If Mohammed had had more time, he might have been able to challenge Nissim’s
point about Israelis’ greater fears as well as pointing to another important
difference between his and his Israeli interlocutor’s respective plights.
The far greater accuracy of Israel’s weaponry in no way confers peace of
mind. The fact is that a Palestinian civilian in Gaza is in far more danger of
being killed or injured by one of Israel’s precision armaments than an Israeli
is by one of the more primitive rockets being launched out of Gaza.
In Operation Cast Lead, Israel’s attack on Gaza in winter 2008-09, three
Israelis were killed by rocket attacks, and six soldiers died in fighting. In
Gaza, meanwhile, nearly 1,400 Palestinians were killed, of whom at least 1,000
were not involved in hostilities, according to the Israeli group B’Tselem.
Many, if not most, of those civilians were killed by so-called precision bombs
and missiles.
If Israelis like Nissim really believe they have to endure greater suffering
because the Palestinians lack accurate weapons, then maybe they should start
lobbying Washington to distribute its military hardware more equitably, so that
the Palestinians can receive the same allocations of military aid and armaments
as Israel.
Or alternatively, they could lobby their own government to allow Iran and
Hizbullah to bring into Gaza more sophisticated technology than can currently
be smuggled in via the tunnels.
The other difference is that, unlike Nissim and his family, most people in
Gaza have nowhere else to flee. And the reason that they must live under the
rain of bombs in one of the most densely populated areas on earth is because
Israel – and to a lesser extent Egypt – has sealed the borders to create a
prison for them.
Israel has denied Gaza a port, control of its airspace and the right of its
inhabitants to move to the other Palestinian territory recognised by the Oslo
accords, the West Bank. It is not, as Israel’s supporters allege, that Hamas is
hiding among Palestinian civilians; rather, Israel has forced Palestinian
civilians to live in a tiny strip of land that Israel turned into a war
zone.
So who is chiefly to blame for the escalation that currently threatens the
nearly two million inhabitants of Gaza? Though Hamas’ hands are not entirely
clean, there are culprits far more responsible than the Palestinian
militants.
First culprit: The state of Israel
The inciting cause of the latest confrontation between Israel and Hamas has
little to do with the firing of rockets, whether by Hamas or the other
Palestinian factions.
The conflict predates the rockets – and even the creation of Hamas – by
decades. It is the legacy of Israel’s dispossession of Palestinians in 1948,
forcing many of them from their homes in what is now Israel into the tiny Gaza
Strip. That original injustice has been compounded by the occupation Israel has
not only failed to end but has actually intensified in recent years with its
relentless siege of the small strip of territory.
Israel has been progressively choking the life out of Gaza, destroying its
economy, periodically wrecking its infrastructure, denying its inhabitants
freedom of movement and leaving its population immiserated.
One only needs to look at the restrictions on Gazans’ access to their own
sea. Here we are not considering their right to use their own coast to leave
and enter their territory, simply their right to use their own waters to feed
themselves. According to one provision of the Oslo accords, Gaza was given
fishing rights up to 20 miles off its shore. Israel has slowly whittled that
down to just three miles, with Israeli navy vessels firing on fishing boats
even inside that paltry limit.
Palestinians in Gaza are entitled to struggle for their right to live and
prosper. That struggle is a form of self-defence – not aggression – against
occupation, oppression, colonialism and imperialism.
Second culprit: Binyamin Netanyahu and Ehud
Barak
The Israeli prime minister and defence minister have taken a direct and
personal hand, above and beyond Israel’s wider role in enforcing the
occupation, in escalating the violence.
Israel and its supporters always make it their first priority when Israel
launches a new war of aggression to obscure the timeline of events as a way to
cloud responsibility. The media willingly regurgitates such efforts at
misdirection.
In reality, Israel engineered a confrontation to provide the pretext for a
“retaliatory” attack, just as it did four years earlier in Operation Cast Lead.
Then Israel broke a six-month ceasefire agreed with Hamas by staging a raid
into Gaza that killed six Hamas members.
This time, on 8 November, Israel achieved the same end by invading Gaza
again, on this occasion following a two-week lull in tensions. A 13-year-old
boy out playing football was killed by an Israeli bullet.
Tit-for-tat violence over the following days resulted in the injury of eight
Israelis, including four soldiers, and the deaths of five Palestinian
civilians, and the wounding of dozens more in Gaza.
On November 12, as part of efforts to calm things down, the Palestinian
militant factions agreed a truce that held two days – until Israel broke it by
assassinating Hamas military leader Ahmed Jabari. The rockets out of Gaza that
followed these various Israeli provocations have been misrepresented as the
casus belli.
But if Netanyahu and Barak are responsible for creating the immediate
pretext for an attack on Gaza, they are also criminally negligent for failing
to pursue an opportunity to secure a much longer truce with Hamas.
We now know, thanks to Israeli peace activist Gershon Baskin, that in the
period leading up to Jabari’s execution Egypt had been working to secure a
long-term truce between Israel and Hamas. Jabari was apparently eager to agree
to it.
Baskin, who was intimately involved in the talks, was a credible conduit
between Israel and Hamas because he had played a key role last year in getting
Jabari to sign off on a prisoner exchange that led to the release of Israeli
soldier Gilad Shalit. Baskin noted in the Haaretz newspaper that Jabari’s
assassination “killed the possibility of achieving a truce and also the
Egyptian mediators’ ability to function.”
The peace activist had already met Barak to alert him to the truce, but it
seems the defence minister and Netanyahu had more pressing concerns than ending
the tensions between Israel and Hamas.
What could have been more important than finding a mechanism for saving
lives, on both the Palestinian and Israeli sides. Baskin offers a clue: “Those
who made the decision must be judged by the voters, but to my regret they will
get more votes because of this.”
It seems Israel’s general election, due in January, was uppermost in the
minds of Netanyahu and Barak.
A lesson learnt by Israeli leaders over recent years, as Baskin notes, is
that wars are vote-winners solely for the right wing. That should be clear to
no one more than Netanyahu. He has twice before become prime minister on the
back of wars waged by his more “moderate” political opponents as they faced
elections.
Shimon Peres, a dove by no standard except a peculiar Israeli one, launched
an attack on Lebanon, Operation Grapes of Wrath, that cost him the election in
1996. And centrists Ehud Olmert and Tzipi Livni again helped Netanyahu to
victory by attacking Gaza in late 2008.
Israelis, it seems, prefer a leader who does not bother to wrap a velvet
glove around his iron fist.
Netanyahu was already forging ahead in the polls before he minted Operation
Pillar of Defence. But the electoral fortunes of Ehud Barak, sometimes
described as Netanyahu’s political Siamese twin and a military mentor to
Netanyahu from their commando days together, have been looking grim indeed.
Barak desperately needed a military rather than a political campaign to
boost his standing and get his renegade Independence party across the electoral
threshold and into the Israeli parliament. It seems Netanyahu, thinking he had
little to lose himself from an operation in Gaza, may have been willing to
oblige.
Third culprit: The Israeli army
Israel’s army has become addicted to two doctrines it calls the “deterrence
principle” and its “qualitative military edge”. Both are fancy ways of saying
that, like some mafia heavy, the Israeli army wants to be sure it alone can
“whack” its enemies. Deterrence, in Israeli parlance, does not refer to a
balance of fear but Israel’s exclusive right to use terror.
The amassing of rockets by Hamas, therefore, violates the Israeli army’s own
sense of propriety, just as Hizbullah’s stockpiling does further north. Israel
wants its neighbouring enemies to have no ability to resist its dictates.
Doubtless the army was only too ready to back Netanyahu and Barak’s
electioneering if it also provided an opportunity to clean out some of Hamas’
rocket arsenal.
But there is another strategic reason why the Israeli army has been chomping
at the bit to crack down on Hamas again.
Haaretz’s two chief military correspondents explained the logic of the
army’s position last week, shortly after Israel killed Jabari. They reported:
“For a long time now Israel has been pursuing a policy of containment in the
Gaza Strip, limiting its response to the prolonged effort on the part of Hamas
to dictate new rules of the game surrounding the fence, mainly in its attempt
to prevent the entry of the IDF into the ‘perimeter,’ the strip of a few
hundred meters wide to the west of the fence.”
In short, Hamas has angered Israeli commanders by refusing to sit quietly
while the army treats large areas of Gaza as its playground and enters at
will.
Israel has created what it terms a “buffer zone” inside the fence around
Gaza, often up to a kilometre wide, that Palestinians cannot enter but the
Israeli army can use as a gateway for launching its “incursions”.
Remote-controlled guns mounted on Israeli watch-towers around Gaza can open
fire on any Palestinian who is considered to have approached too close.
Three incidents shortly before Jabari’s extra-judicial execution illustrate
the struggle for control over Gaza’s interior.
On November 4, the Israeli army shot dead a young Palestinian man inside
Gaza as he was reported to have approached the fence. Palestinians say he was
mentally unfit and that he could have been saved by medics had ambulances not
been prevented from reaching him for several hours.
On November 8, as already noted, the Israeli army made an incursion into
Gaza to attack Palestinian militants and in the process shot dead a boy playing
football.
And on November 10, two days later, Palestinian fighters fired an anti-tank
missile that destroyed a Jeep patrolling the perimeter fence around Gaza,
wounding four soldiers.
As the Haaretz reporters note, Hamas appears to be trying to demonstrate
that it has as much right to defend its side of the “border fence” as Israel
does on the other side.
The army’s response to this display of native impertinence has been to
inflict a savage form of collective punishment on Gaza to remind Hamas who is
boss.
Fourth culprit: the White House
It is near-impossible to believe that Netanyahu decided to revive Israel’s
policy of extra-judicial executions of Hamas leaders – and bystanders – without
at least consulting the White House. Israel clearly also held off from
beginning its escalation until after the US elections, restricting itself, as
it did in Cast Lead, to the “downtime” in US politics between the elections and
the presidential inauguration.
That was designed to avoid overly embarrassing the US president. A fair
assumption must be that Barack Obama approved Israel’s operation in advance.
Certainly he has provided unstinting backing since, despite the wildly
optimistic scenarios painted by some analysts that he was likely to seek
revenge on Netanyahu in his second term.
Also, it should be remembered that Israel’s belligerence towards Gaza, and
the easing of domestic pressure on Israel to negotiate with Hamas or reach a
ceasefire, has largely been made possible because Obama forced US taxpayers to
massively subsidise Israel’s rocket interception system, Iron Dome, to the tune
of hundreds of millions of dollars.
Iron Dome is being used to shoot down rockets out of Gaza that might
otherwise have landed in built-up areas of Israel. Israel and the White House
have therefore been able to sell US munificence on the interception of rockets
as a humanitarian gesture.
But the reality is that Iron Dome has swung Israel’s cost-benefit calculus
sharply in favour of greater aggression because it is has increased Israel’s
sense of impunity. Whatever Hamas’ ability to smuggle into Gaza more
sophisticated weaponry, Israel believes it can neutralise that threat using
interception systems.
Far from being a humanitarian measure, Iron Dome has simply served to ensure
that Gaza will continue to suffer a far larger burden of deaths and injuries in
confrontations with Israel and that such confrontations will continue to occur
regularly.
Here are the four main culprits. They should be held responsible for the
deaths of Palestinians and Israelis in the days and, if Israel expands its
operation, weeks ahead.
Jonathan Cook won the Martha Gellhorn Special Prize for
Journalism. His latest books are “Israel and the Clash of Civilisations: Iraq,
Iran and the Plan to Remake the Middle East” (Pluto Press) and “Disappearing
Palestine: Israel’s Experiments in Human Despair” (Zed Books). His new
website is www.jonathan-cook.net.